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In slapstick comedy, the worst thing that could happen usually does: the person with a 
sore toe manages to stub it, sometimes twice.  Such errors also arise in daily life, and 
research traces the tendency to do precisely the worst thing to ironic processes of mental 
control.  These monitoring processes keep us watchful for errors of thought, speech, and 
action, and enable us to avoid the worst thing in most situations—but they also increase 
the likelihood of such errors when we attempt to exert control under mental load (stress, 
time pressure, or distraction).  Ironic errors in attention and memory occur with 
identifiable brain activity and prompt recurrent unwanted thoughts, attraction to 
forbidden desires, expression of objectionable social prejudices, production of movement 
errors, and rebounds of negative experiences such as anxiety, pain, and depression.  Such 
ironies can be overcome when effective control strategies are deployed and mental load is 
minimized. 
 




 There are many kinds of errors.  We can fall short, over-reach, or skitter off the 
edge, of course, but we can also miss by a mile, take our eyes off the prize, throw the 
baby out with the bathwater—and otherwise foul up in a disturbingly wide variety of 
ways.  Standing out in this assortment of would-be wreckage, though, is one kind of error 
that’s special:  the precisely counter-intentional error.  This is when we manage to do the 
worst possible thing, the blunder so outrageous that we think about it in advance and 
resolve not to let that happen.   
 And then it does.  We see a rut coming up in the road ahead and proceed to steer 
our bike right into it.  We make a mental note not to mention a sore point in conversation, 
and then cringe in horror as we blurt out exactly that thing.  We carefully cradle the glass 
of red wine as we cross the room, all the while thinking “don’t spill”—and then juggle it 
onto the carpet under the gaze of our host.  Normally, our vigilance for such pitfalls helps 
us avoid them.  We steer away from ruts, squelch improper comments, and protect 
carpets from spills by virtue of our sensitivity to error.  Knowing the worst that could 
happen is essential for control.  But sometimes this sensitivity backfires, becoming part 
of a perverse psychological process that makes the worst occur. 
 Observers of human psychology have suggested that the mind can indeed 
generate just such ironic errors.  Edgar Allan Poe (1) called this unfortunate feature of 
mind the “imp of the perverse.”  Sigmund Freud (2) dubbed it the “counter will.”  
William James (3) said too that “automatic activity in the nerves often runs most counter 
to the selective pressure of consciousness.”  Charles Baudouin (4) pronounced it the “law 
of reversed effort,” and Charles Darwin (5) joined in to proclaim “How unconsciously 
many habitual actions are performed, indeed not rarely in direct opposition to our 




conscious will!”  Hieronymus Bosch (1453-1516) illustrated this human preoccupation 
with the worst, depicting a world in which error, sin, and ruin are the usual consequence 
of human endeavor (see Figure 1).  






Figure 1.  This detail from The Last Judgment by Hieronymus Bosch (1453-1516) 








Intentions and Ironies: Best and Worst 
 Do we do the worst thing more often than other things?  Fortunately for the 
proprietors of china shops, we do not.  However, accumulating evidence on ironic 
processes of mental control (6) reveals conditions under which people commit precisely 
counter-intentional errors.  The prototypical error of this kind occurs when people are 
asked to keep a thought out of mind (e.g., “Don’t think about a white bear”).  The thought 
often comes back.  When asked to signal any return of that thought, people may indicate 
that it comes back about once per minute (7)—often to echo for yet longer periods (8) 
and, at the extreme, to return for days (9, 10).  Some people are better at such thought 
suppression than others (11, 12), of course, and some try more than others (13)—but 
keeping a thought out of mind remains a challenge for most of us even when we have 
only arbitrarily tried to suppress it. 
 Why would thought suppression be so hard?  It does seem paradoxical:  We try to  
put out of mind what we are thinking now, while still remembering at some level not to 
think of it later.  The ironic process theory (6) suggests we achieve this trick through two 
mental processes: The first is a conscious, effortful process aimed at creating the desired 
mental state.  The person engaged in suppressing white bear thoughts, for example, might 
peruse the room or otherwise cast about for something—anything—that is not a white 
bear.  Filling the mind with other things, after all, achieves “not thinking of a white bear.”   
 As these distracters enter consciousness, though, a small part of the mind remains 
strangely alert to the white bear, searching for indications of this thought in service of 
ushering it away with more distractions.  Ironic process theory proposes that this second 
component of suppression is an ironic monitoring process, an unconscious search for the 




very mental state that is unwanted.  The conscious search for distractions and the 
unconscious search for the unwanted thought work together to achieve suppression—the 
conscious search doing the work and the unconscious search checking for errors. 
 The control system underlying conscious mental control is unique, however, in 
that its monitoring process can also produce errors.  When distractions, stressors, or other 
mental loads interfere with conscious attempts at self-distraction, they leave unchecked 
the ironic monitor to sensitize us to exactly what we don’t want.  This is not a passive 
monitor like those often assumed in control system theories, but rather is an active 
unconscious search for errors that subtly and consistently increases their likelihood via 
processes of cognitive priming (14).  For example, when people are asked not to think 
about a target word while under pressure to respond quickly in a word association task, 
they become inclined to offer precisely that forbidden target word (15).  Indeed, with 
time pressure people more often blurt out a word while suppressing it than when they are 
specifically asked to concentrate on it.    
 Fortunately, the ironic return of suppressed thoughts is not inevitable or we would 
be plagued by every thought we had ever tried to put out of mind.  We can stop thinking 
of things quite successfully when we have time to devote to the project and become 
absorbed in our self-distractions. The ironic rebound of suppressed thoughts following 
suppression is mainly evident when people abandon the attempt to suppress or are 
encouraged to revisit the suppressed thought (16, 17).  The ironic return of suppressed 
thoughts during suppression is found only sporadically when people are simply reporting 
their thoughts, but is readily observed with measures of thought that are sensitive to 
automatic, uncontrollable indications of the thought (18). 




 For example, when people are asked to name the colors in which words are 
displayed and encounter a word they have been asked not to think about, they name the 
word’s color more slowly—apparently because their attention is rapidly drawn to the 
word’s meaning and so interferes with color-naming (15, 19).  Such automatic attention 
to suppressed thoughts surfaces in color-naming when people are under mental load (such 
as holding a 5-digit number in mind), and can be found as an effect of load in many 
paradigms (20, 21).  Color-naming research reveals, though, that ironic monitoring 
processes are not limited only to suppression; they also occur during intentional 
concentration.  People intentionally concentrating on particular words under load show 
slowed color-naming for words that are not concentration targets—as these non-targets 
now pop more easily to mind (19).  Perhaps this is why concentrating under pressure—
such as during last-minute studying—seems to accentuate the clarity of every stray noise 
within earshot. 
 The ironic monitoring process also influences memory.  Memories we try to 
forget can be more easily remembered because of the ironic results of our efforts—but 
they do this mainly when mental loads undermine conscious attempts to avoid the 
memories (22, 23).  People attempting to forget many items at once can do so with some 
success (24, 25), however, perhaps because monitoring multiple control projects dilutes 
ironic monitoring effects (26).  Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies show 
similar disparity in brain activity:  People trying to forget many targets show a suite of 
changes in brain activity associated with forgetting (27), whereas those trying not to think 
of a single target show specific monitoring-related activity of the anterior cingulate and 




dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (28, 29).  The brain regions subserving ironic and 
intentional processes are differentiable when people do targeted mental control tasks. 
Taboos and Faux Pas: Worst Thoughts and Utterances 
 Ironic lapses of mental control often appear when we attempt to be socially 
desirable—as when we try to keep our minds out of the gutter.  People instructed to stop 
thinking of sex, for example, show greater arousal (as gauged by finger skin 
conductance) than do those asked to stop thinking about a neutral topic.  Indeed, levels of 
arousal are inflated during the suppression of sex thoughts to the same degree that they 
inflate during attempts to concentrate on such thoughts (8).  In research on sexual arousal 
per se, male participants instructed to inhibit erections as they watched erotic films found 
it harder than they had hoped, so to speak—particularly if they imbibed a mental load in 
the form of a couple of alcoholic drinks (30).  Ironic effects also may underlie the 
tendency of homophobic males to show exaggerated sexual arousal to homoerotic 
pictures (31).  
 The causal role of forbidden desires in ironic effects is clear in experimental 
research on the effects of imposed secrecy (32).  People randomly paired to play 
“footsie” under the table in a lab study reported greater subsequent attraction to their 
assigned partner when they had been asked to keep their contact secret from others at the 
table, and survey respondents revealed similar effects of tainted love:  a greater desire for 
past romantic partners with whom relationships had first started in secret (33).  This 
desire seems to arise as an ironic emotional effect of suppression: People who are asked 
not to think about a specific old flame show greater psychophysiological arousal than do 
others when later allowed to think about that relationship (34).     




 Like forbidden romance, other occasions for social deception are a fertile source 
of ironic effects.  People admonished to keep an item private in conversation, for 
example, become more likely to mention it; speakers asked to keep a target hidden from 
an addressee more often leaked its identity by making inadvertent reference to it—for 
example, describing the target in Figure 2 as a “small triangle” and thereby revealing that 
the occluded object was a larger one (35).  Interviewees with eating disorders who role-
played not having a disorder for the interviewer also showed ironic effects.  During the 
interview, they reported intrusive thoughts of eating, and revealed preoccupation with the 
topic by rating the interviewer, too, as the likely victim of an eating disorder (36).  
 








Speaker who is asked to describe the mutually visible target becomes more likely to 
mention a clue to the hidden target that is irrelevant to the addressee (e.g., saying “small 
triangle” rather than “triangle”) when instructed to conceal the identity of the target from 
the addressee (from 35). 
 




 Another challenge for mental control is keeping a lid on our social prejudices.  
There is substantial evidence that racism, sexism, homophobia, and other prejudices can 
be expressed automatically, after all, even when we try to control them (37, 38).  But the 
ironic process theory holds that unconscious urges to express such prejudices will be 
especially insistent when we try to control them under load.  This possibility was initially 
documented in research that asked British participants to suppress their stereotypes of 
skinheads (white supremacists) and found that such stereotypes then rebounded—even 
leading experimental participants to sit far away from a skinhead in a waiting room (39).  
Ironic effects have since surfaced showing that expressions of prejudice against racial, 
ethnic, national, and gender groups are often prompted by attempts to be “politically 
correct” under mental load (40-42).  The desire to be fair and unprejudiced, exercised in 
haste or distraction, can engender surprising levels of bias and prejudice. 
Yips and Worries: Worst Movements and Emotions 
 Pressures to avoid the worst are not always a matter of doing what is socially 
desirable—they can arise in attempts to achieve self-imposed goals as well.  The desire to 
succeed at a task defines the worst thing that could happen in that situation as failure at 
this task.  So, when people grasp a string with a weight attached and try to keep this 
pendulum from swinging in one direction, they often find that the pendulum swings in 
just the way they hope to avoid (43).  And, as predicted by ironic process theory, the 
pendulum is even more likely to swing in the unwanted direction when its holder is 
distracted by counting backward from 1000 by 3s (see Figure 3).   
 
 






Figure 3.  Sample tracings of 30-sec videos from below a handheld pendulum on a string 
when pendulum holder is asked to (A) hold it steady, (B) keep it from swinging parallel 
to the arrow, (C) hold it steady while counting backward from 1000 by 3s, or (D) keep it 
from swinging parallel to the arrow while counting backward from 1000 by 3s (based on 
data from 43). 
 




 Sports psychologists and coaches are familiar with ironic movement errors, 
counterintentional movements induced by the very desire to prevent them.  Former major 
league baseball players Chuck Knoblauch, Steve Blass, and Rick Ankiel were famed for 
sporadic wild throws as well as for the desire to avoid them—Ankiel even calling his 
chronic error “the Creature” (44).  In golf putting, the ironic tendency has a name (the 
“yips”), and golfers who are instructed to avoid a particular error (e.g., “don’t 
overshoot”) indeed make it more often when under load (43, 45).  Eye-tracking cameras 
reveal that soccer players who are instructed to avoid kicking a penalty shot to a 
particular part of the goal more often direct their gaze to the very area to be avoided (46).  
Perhaps the common sensation we get as we look over a precipice—that we are teetering 
toward the edge—is an accurate perception of our subtle ironic movements.  (It may be 
best when poised at the brink, by the way, not to count backward from 1000 by 3s.) 
 Worries and fears are also fertile ground for ironic effects.  Unwanted emotions 
associated with thoughts not only provide a reason to avoid those thoughts, but also 
prompt an unwanted emotional punch when the thoughts return.  Emotions we put out of 
mind are experienced with unusual intensity when the emotional thoughts recur following 
suppression (19, 34, 47).  Depressed mood is especially recalcitrant, recurring after 
suppression when reminders, negative events, or increased mental loads are encountered 
(48).  And when anxious thoughts are suppressed under mental load, their return can 
rekindle anxiety with particular vigor (49).   
 Worry about falling asleep yields similar ironic effects:  People urged to fall 
asleep as quickly as possible, but who are also given a mental load (in the form of Sousa 
march music), are particularly likely then to have trouble sleeping (50).  The common 




observation that dreams center on unpleasant and emotionally disturbing topics makes 
sense in this light:  When people are instructed to suppress thoughts of neutral or 
emotional topics prior to sleep, they report more frequent dreaming about those topics 
(51-53).  If we spontaneously choose to avoid unpleasant or worrisome thoughts in 
daytime, it makes sense that such thoughts would then populate our dreams.  
 Puzzling ironies arise too in response to pain.  Usually, people exposed to painful 
stimulation report higher levels of felt pain when they direct their attention toward the 
pain.  However, suppression of laboratory-induced pain can result in some ironic effects, 
including ironic increments in suppressed pain and ironic decrements in attended pain 
(54-56).  Such effects are unreliable and have not been examined under variations in 
mental load, though, so conclusions are not yet clear (57, 58).  Caution should also be 
exercised in considering ironic effects of thinking about death.  People suppress thoughts 
of death spontaneously or use strategies other than direct suppression, so ironic effects of 
suppressing thoughts of one’s own death are not always evident (59).  Research on such 
effects is complicated when natural attempts people make to gain mental control obscure 
the effects of experimental manipulations of control striving. 
Putting the Worst Behind Us 
 The ubiquity of ironic effects suggests we should consider it something of a treat 
when we control ourselves successfully.  According to ironic process theory, however, 
successful control is likely to be far more prevalent than ironic error because people often 
use effective strategies for control and deploy them under conditions that are not mentally 
loading.  Ironic effects are often small, and the experimental production of ironic errors 
often depends on the introduction of artificial loads, time pressures, or other means of 




magnifying ironic effects.  Even such amplifiers of ironic error may be overcome, 
however, in certain individuals with talents for mental control.  People who are 
susceptible to hypnotic suggestion, for example, and who are given suggestions to control 
thoughts, show heightened mental control without ironic effects (60, 61).   
 The rest of us, however, who go through life without special talent for mental 
control, sometimes must turn to other tactics to overcome ironic error.  Strategies people 
use to relax excessive striving for control, for example, show promise in reducing the 
severity of ironic effects.  Potentially effective strategies include accepting symptoms 
rather than attempting to control them (62) and disclosing problems rather than keeping 
them secret (63).  Therapies devised for improving mental control—or for helping people 
to relax it—remain largely untested, however, and there are enough ambiguities 
surrounding the translation of laboratory research into effective treatments that 
recommendations for clinical practice at this time are premature.  Current research 
indicates only that under certain conditions, we may be better able to avoid the worst in 
what we think, do, or say by avoiding the avoiding.  Failing that, our best option is to 
orchestrate our circumstances so as to minimize mental load when mental control is 
needed.  
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